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Introduction 
Much has been written about the issues of Aboriginal Australian self-determination, 
self-governance and sovereignty. This report attempts to identify a way forward on 
some of the challenging self-governance and service delivery issues facing 
governments and Aboriginal peoples, by identifying strategic opportunities for 
change and the development of more collaborative relationships. It has been 
commissioned by the Central Australian regional office of the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC). However the report has not been restricted, in 
its commissioning, to either an ATSIC or a Central Australian perspective. The 
issues here are of relevance to all stakeholders dealing with the related issues of 
governance and service delivery for remote Aboriginal communities across the 
Northern Territory. Underlying the report is the basic premise that self-governance, 
local government and service delivery are inextricably intertwined both conceptually, 
and in practice. 
We commence by providing some background on Aboriginal affairs reform 
dating from the 1970s and the granting of Northern Territory self-government in 
1978, and describe the emergence of some rather adversarial relationships in 
governance and service delivery for remote Northern Territory Aboriginal 
communities during the 1980s and 1990s. These adversarial relationships between 
Commonwealth-sponsored and Northern Territory-sponsored organisations need to 
be overcome. In this context, more collaborative approaches to gaining effective self-
governance and service delivery for remote Aboriginal communities are emerging, 
but they require significant further development, and need to be underpinned by the 
development of regional service delivery agreements. 
The report also examines land rights and local government reform proposals 
and more collaborative service delivery arrangements already being developed in 
housing and health. The need for the further development of regional support 
organisations to assist and service local Aboriginal communities is identified as a 
critical factor, while acknowledging that in discrete remote communities many 
services must still be addressed at the individual community level. We argue 
strongly for an incremental, but planned, approach to governance and service 
delivery reform, rather than grand institutional redesign. Potential implications and 
ways forward for Central Australia are considered and related recommendations are 
set out at the end of the report. 
Aboriginal affairs reform and Northern Territory self-
government: developments of the 1970s 
During the 1970s, Aboriginal affairs, both in Australia generally and the Northern 
Territory in particular, underwent significant reform. The Welfare Branch of the 
Commonwealth’s Northern Territory administration disappeared and became part of 
a new national Commonwealth Department of Aboriginal Affairs (DAA). In the 
process former Welfare Branch officers were removed from many remote Aboriginal 
communities in the Northern Territory and replaced by community advisors 
employed by, and answerable to, local Aboriginal community organisations. These 
emergent Aboriginal community organisations were encouraged to incorporate by the 
DAA (primarily under the Commonwealth Aboriginal Councils and Associations Act 
1976 (ACAA)) and were funded for the delivery of some services and the conduct of 
some aspects of local governance in their communities. 
Meanwhile, in response to growing national and international pressure, 
Aboriginal land rights were becoming an issue of major concern across Australia. 
Both Labor and Coalition Commonwealth Governments pursued land rights reforms 
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in the Northern Territory, where the Commonwealth could act without the 
complications of a concurrent State jurisdiction. The result was the Aboriginal Land 
Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (ALRA), which transferred existing reserved lands 
to Land Trusts representing Aboriginal traditional owners. The ALRA also 
established the Northern Territory Aboriginal land councils as regional bodies to 
support traditional owners both in the management of these lands and in making 
claims for other unalienated crown land (Howie 1981). 
No sooner had these reforms been put in place in Aboriginal affairs, than the 
Commonwealth granted self-government to the Northern Territory under the 
Northern Territory (Self-Government) Act 1978. However this was generally viewed in 
the Northern Territory to be somewhat less than full self-government because there 
were a number of State-type responsibilities which the Commonwealth retained. One 
of these retained responsibilities was matters arising under the ALRA, while another 
related to issues arising under the Commonwealth Atomic Energy Act 1953, and 
hence uranium mining. The importance of these issues in national politics in the 
1970s was behind the retention of responsibilities by the Commonwealth. However, 
from a Northern Territory Government perspective, this retention was fairly quickly 
and strongly resented. 
The historical role of the Commonwealth in administering the Northern 
Territory and in continuing to maintain some direct responsibility for Aboriginal land 
issues through the ALRA following Northern Territory self-government, stands in 
stark contrast to State jurisdictions. Both have contributed to a tendency amongst 
the Northern Territory’s Aboriginal people to look to the Commonwealth to promote 
and protect their interests. The view of the Northern Territory Government, on the 
other hand, emphasises its ‘right to govern’ for all its citizens. These different 
viewpoints have contributed to the development of an adversarial political culture in 
the Northern Territory in the 1980s and 1990s. 
An adversarial political culture: developments in the 1980s 
and 1990s 
At the time of self-government and soon thereafter, the new Northern Territory 
Government moved quickly to occupy as full a governing role as it could across the 
Territory, including in relation to remote Aboriginal communities. It negotiated to 
take responsibility for normal essential services functions under a Memorandum of 
Understanding, including power, water and roads, in 42 of the larger remote 
Aboriginal communities (while leaving such functions in smaller remote Aboriginal 
communities to the DAA). It also quickly enacted local government legislation, which 
as well as providing for municipal governments in urban areas, provided for the 
incorporation of community government councils in smaller or more remote centres. 
This, and a general Northern Territory associations Act, offered two alternative forms 
of incorporation for Aboriginal community organisations to that under the 
Commonwealth’s ACAA. Northern Territory Government departments also began 
offering funding of various sorts to these local Aboriginal community service delivery 
and governance organisations. 
In the land rights arena in the 1980s, the Commonwealth-sponsored 
Aboriginal land councils were busily assisting local groups of Aboriginal traditional 
owners to claim unalienated crown land under the ALRA. The Northern Territory 
Government, on the other hand, generally opposed these claims, if only as it often 
claimed to test their veracity. This process established an increasingly adversarial 
relationship between the new Northern Territory Government and Aboriginal 
interests, as represented by the land councils, in the crucial policy arena of land. 
This adversarial relationship developed in the land rights arena has carried 
over into other policy areas as well. For example, the land councils distrusted the 
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Northern Territory Government’s push for the development of community 
government councils in remote Aboriginal communities, believing that the authority 
of these local governments would conflict with, and undermine the role of, 
traditional Aboriginal land owners in these communities, whose interests the land 
councils represented. 
Rowse (1992: 59–90) summarises the development of this adversarial 
relationship between the Commonwealth-sponsored land councils and the Northern 
Territory Government’s encouragement of community government councils up to the 
early 1990s. Each was, in a sense, trying to marginalise the other in favour of its 
own structure as the single most appropriate organisation for the representation of 
local Aboriginal interests and the delivery of services. Rowse encourages us to be 
sceptical of the assumption, held on both sides of this debate, ‘that community 
power is, or should be made to be, a unified, centralised sovereignty’. This, he 
argues, is ‘one of the most common and seductive assumptions in the discussion of 
Aboriginal self-government’, which ought to be resisted (Rowse 1992: 89). Rowse 
notes that: 
If there is one lesson that must be drawn from an anthropological consideration 
of Aborigines’ emerging instruments of self-determination, it is that ‘autonomy’ 
refers not only to Aborigines’ relationships with non-Aboriginal society, but, just 
as important, it refers to their relationships with one another (Rowse 1992: 90). 
Rowse directs us, instead, to a model of ‘dispersed governance’ for Aboriginal 
communities, which is to some extent already being practiced (Rowse 1992: 89). 
There should, he argues, be a series of agencies involved in governance and service 
delivery for the Northern Territory’s Aboriginal communities, all of which are ‘able to 
negotiate cooperation with one another when the need arises, but secure in their 
autonomy’ (Rowse 1992: 90).  
This analysis remains valid today. We will shortly examine the latest attempts 
to reform land council and local government structures for remote Aboriginal 
communities in the Northern Territory in the light of this analysis. First, however, 
some comments on economic development. 
Economic development and co-dependence 
The ongoing tensions between the aspirations of Aboriginal people for self-
determination and self-government have, on the one hand, been expressed and 
pursued through ATSIC, land councils, community councils and other Aboriginal 
organisations in the Northern Territory. Meanwhile on the other hand, the Northern 
Territory Government’s primary focus has remained on economic (and specifically 
resource) development and its ‘right’ to govern. These historical developments have 
in part contributed to entrenched and unresolved tensions between Northern 
Territory Aboriginal interests and the Northern Territory Government. These were 
most recently evidenced in the failure of the statehood referendum in 1999 (which 
was overwhelmingly rejected by Aboriginal voters) and the current debate over 
mandatory sentencing laws. 
However Aboriginal people are major economic stakeholders in the Northern 
Territory. They currently own 40 per cent (potentially 52%) of the Northern Territory 
land mass. The Northern Territory economy remains heavily reliant on meeting 
Aboriginal service delivery needs, resource development and cultural tourism. The 
only other industries are defence, high levels of subsidised Commonwealth 
Government general revenues and Northern Territory Government capital works 
programs (Northern Territory Government 1999; Commonwealth of Australia 1995). 
There also continues to be a significant Aboriginal component to the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission’s (CGC) determination of expenditure disability 
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factors for the Northern Territory, upon which the Northern Territory Government 
budget continues to be heavily reliant (Smith 1992a, 1992b). 
In a real sense, there is therefore already an unstated and perhaps unwilling 
‘partnership’ of economic co-dependence between the Northern Territory Government 
and Territory Aboriginal people. This is despite the current Chief Minister’s 
statements (ABC Parliamentary News Network, July 1999) that the ALRA has 
primarily led to the Northern Territory inheriting a welfare-dependant Aboriginal 
population. The negatively constructed economic co-dependence of previous decades 
needs to be recast as an economic partnership, and this paper concentrates on ways 
to facilitate such a change. 
Recent attempts at land rights and local government reform 
There have in the last couple of years been attempts to initiate reform in both the 
land rights and local government regimes in the Northern Territory. The review of 
the ALRA by John Reeves QC argued for a wholesale restructuring of the institutions 
of Aboriginal land and governance into a Northern Territory Aboriginal Council and 
18 regional land councils (Reeves 1998: chapters 27–8). Meanwhile, in what one 
commentator saw as a mutually inspired move (see Mowbray 1999), the Northern 
Territory Government moved to reform its local government arrangements, 
particularly for small community government councils. 
In February 1999, the Northern Territory Minister for Local Government issued 
a statement on the reform and development of local government in the Northern 
Territory. It argued that many of the Northern Territory’s local councils, servicing 
populations as small as 300 people, were too small to attract ‘sufficient numbers of 
qualified, competent and ethical staff’ or to generate the revenue necessary to 
support the delivery of minimum services or to sustain an administration that allows 
for the achievement of any economies of scale’. Because of this, the Minister argued, 
the number of councils in ‘rural and remote areas’ should be lessened from the 
current number of 62. 
No particular number of councils was set, but the Minister argued that 
‘councils with a population of less than 2,000 people encounter greater difficulties in 
maintaining adequate levels of administration and service delivery over the longer-
term than those with larger populations’ (Braham 1999: 3–4). 
The tenor of this argument in favour of fewer local councils in rural and remote 
areas was comparative and general. It drew, for its inspiration, on an Australia-wide 
local government reform agenda and on experience in States like Victoria, which had 
recently reduced its number of local councils from 210 to 78. However, there was 
another, quite contradictory tenor in the Northern Territory Minister’s statement 
which referred to the ‘unique cultural environment’ of local government in the 
Northern Territory. This, of course, referred to the fact that the vast majority of these 
62 councils in the Northern Territory’s rural and remote areas were providing 
governance for predominantly Aboriginal communities. The Minister noted that the 
existing Northern Territory Local Government Act ‘provides for the recognition of 
traditional Aboriginal decision-making structures’ but that this recognition could be 
strengthened and ‘assist in creating local authorities with legitimacy and credibility’ 
(Braham 1999: 3–4). 
The issue of the legitimacy of existing local government councils in the eyes of 
Aboriginal people was one which the Deputy Secretary of the Northern Territory 
Department of Local Government focused on in an address to the Australian 
Institute of Public Administration in September 1999. He argued that: 
many of the local governments now in place in the Territory are seen as lacking 
legitimacy by their Aboriginal constituents often apparently because the ‘right’ 
people are not making decisions (Coles 1999: 6). 
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He went on to argue that councils could become legitimate in the eyes of their 
Aboriginal constituents if they incorporated greater elements of Aboriginal culture, 
along with elements of ‘western culture’, into their structures. One suggestion was 
‘bi-cameralism’, with one house of ‘democratically elected representatives’ 
empowered to make decisions on the ‘delivery of services’ and another of ‘elders’ 
deliberating and making decisions on matter such as ‘land and cultural matters’ 
(Coles 1999: 11). 
These arguments supporting local government reform in the Northern Territory 
have a number of problems. One is the switching between comparative general and 
Northern Territory-specific forms of argument. If, as the latter form of argument 
suggests, the situation in the Northern Territory is unique within Australia, then 
this rather undermines and detracts from the former form of argument. Another 
problem is the claim that existing local governments lack legitimacy in the eyes of 
Aboriginal people and that new local government structures, which incorporated 
greater elements of Aboriginal tradition and culture, would enjoy greater legitimacy. 
On the Minister’s and the Deputy Secretary’s own admission, past local government 
structures have already tried to incorporate elements of Aboriginal tradition and 
culture. So why should new efforts to do this fare any better, or any worse, than 
past efforts? A third problem with the specific suggestion of bi-cameralism is that it 
will inevitably be seen by the land councils as another attempt by the Northern 
Territory local government authorities to take over the functions of land councils and 
traditional owners; despite the Deputy Secretary’s insistence that there is no 
‘particular value’ in continuing the argument with the land councils (Coles 1999: 5). 
Many Northern Territory remote Aboriginal communities already have a form of 
multi-cameralism or pluralism in their governance structures. This may include, for 
example, having Land Trusts of traditional owners supported by the land councils; 
royalty associations servicing traditional owners and other Aboriginal residents; and 
local councils representing residents working on a range of other matters in relation 
to numerous Commonwealth and Territory agencies (not to mention a range of other 
incorporated associations which deliver government type services). Why impose 
within one organisational structure a bi-cameralism, when there already exists a 
multi-cameralism by virtue of the presence in these communities of a number of 
parallel organisational structures? 
There is also the problem that only about half the 62 local councils in rural 
and remote areas of the Northern Territory are community government councils 
incorporated under the Northern Territory Local Government Act. The others are 
‘association’ councils incorporated under the Commonwealth ACAA or the general 
Northern Territory associations legislation. In relation to these, the Northern 
Territory Government would need to rely on persuasion and incentives to encourage 
them to incorporate under its proposed local government arrangements. These 
association councils could still decide to stay outside the Northern Territory 
Government’s reformed local government arrangements and there would be little the 
Government could do. The reformed situation would be little different from the 
present, except to add yet another tier of local government. 
To use Rowse’s terminology, it seems that both Reeves’s proposals for land 
rights reform in the Northern Territory and the Northern Territory Minister’s 
proposals for local government reform are once again captivated by the idea of a 
unified local sovereignty being put in place in Aboriginal communities. Experience 
both in Australia in respect to the ALRA and the Native Title Act 1993, and overseas, 
is that governments prefer to deal with wider regional population groupings, not 
small-localised groups. 
Solutions based on creating radically altered or new institutions are a constant 
feature of the Aboriginal affairs landscape. However, such solutions are often 
simplistic and naive. Reeves’s simplistic approach to reform of the ALRA and its 
related financial institutions, using a broad policy approach based on major 
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institutional restructuring, evidenced the most recent attempt. Specifically, he 
recommended more centralised financial institutional controls—the Northern 
Territory Aboriginal Council—over 18 newly established regional land councils that 
would, in turn, represent a wider constituency of regional Aboriginal interests than 
simply traditional owners. 
Reeves’s argument was that the institutional mechanisms for traditional 
owners to make decisions about their inalienable land ownership could be combined 
into a new institutional mechanism for making broader decisions about service 
delivery. However he failed to recognise that very different constituencies, applying 
different criteria and objectives, should and do make decisions regarding matters 
such as land, health and education in Aboriginal communities. 
The proposed local government reforms also fail to acknowledge that one of the 
principal problems of the community government scheme is that it assumed these 
organisations could undertake responsibility for a multiple range of service delivery 
functions. In most cases, experience has proved that these organisations simply do 
not have the capacity to undertake a wide range of functions at once, as evidenced 
by the continuing disproportionate expenditures on compliance costs of the current 
community government scheme by the Northern Territory Government. 
Rather than being seduced by the simplicity of radical institutional reform and 
a unified sovereignty approach, it may be more useful to think in terms of 
incremental change and the benefits of a ‘dispersed governance’ approach. 
The benefits of ‘dispersed self-governance’ 
What are the benefits of dispersed self-governance for remote Aboriginal 
communities, as we see them? 
First and foremost is an ability for different interests within these communities 
to make their voices heard and their presence felt. All too often it is assumed that 
remote Aboriginal communities have a unity of interests, which is best represented 
by a unity of local organisation. 
A better starting point, however, may be to posit a diversity of local interests—
with differences between young and old, men and women, land owners and non-land 
owners, drinkers and non-drinkers, people of different families or clans, those who 
want greater engagement with the external non-Aboriginal economy and society and 
those who are inclined to focus more of their time and attention on traditional 
Aboriginal activities. 
Once such a diversity of interests is recognised within remote Aboriginal 
communities, the seductiveness of the unified local sovereignty approach starts to be 
exposed and the attractiveness of a dispersed governance model becomes more 
obvious. Different interests can be accommodated within local councils, but 
community members can also turn to different local organisations, such as Land 
Trusts, women’s organisations, or outstation resource agencies, if they feel their 
interests are not being well represented within a particular council. This, of course, 
would be impossible under a strictly unified local sovereignty. 
Alternatively, it might be suggested that the desire to be heard by those who 
feel suppressed would soon lead to the breakdown of a strictly unified local 
sovereignty, even if it were somehow to be instituted. Conversely, when diverse 
interests are not equitably accommodated, their members can become marginalised 
and withdraw their voice from active involvement in local affairs. Some degree of 
dispersed governance becomes, therefore, not only desirable but also virtually 
inevitable, wherever there is a diversity of local interests. The fundamental challenge 
is, however, to ensure equitable representation of, and access by, diverse interests 
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within such arrangements in such a way that militates against systemic corruption 
or the misapplication of funds. 
Martin and Finlayson (1996) have identified two models of response most 
commonly adopted in addressing this issue. The first and most common 
bureaucratically adopted solution is to develop greater scrutiny of administrative 
processes involving financial and other related accountability measures. This 
effectively describes the current disproportionate and primary focus of Northern 
Territory local government field officers. The second model seeks to appreciate the 
cultural logic of both parties (i.e., bureaucracies and Aboriginal peoples) and to 
structure arrangements that strike the appropriate balance and maintain the 
necessary safeguards in terms of ensuring both internal (Aboriginal) and external 
(supra-ordinate) accountability. 
The ‘Harvard Project on American Indian Economic Development’ has, over a 
14-year period, systematically examined the conditions of successful self-determined 
economic development of American Indian Reservations in 48 States in the United 
States of America. The results of this work have identified comparative criteria to 
assess the preconditions for effective self-governance. These include identifying why 
some communities are comparatively more successful in running their own affairs, 
delivering effective services and engaging in economic activities. The study found 
that one of the key factors that applied in communities who have achieved sustained 
economic success is the operation of effective governing institutions, which are 
critical determinants of development outcomes. The study concluded that the 
chances of sustainable development rise when communities put in place effective 
non-politicised dispute resolution mechanisms, shut down opportunistic rent 
seeking by politicians and build capable bureaucracies (Cornell et al. 2000). This 
work has been used to develop some criteria by which effectiveness may be 
measured and explained using both quantitative and qualitative measures.  
On the issue of scale and the ability to recruit and retain competent ethical 
staff, as the Northern Territory Local Government Minister put it, the dispersed 
governance model is probably no worse than the unified local sovereignty model. 
Whilst scale and staff numbers in these communities vary considerably, even with 
reform, they would still be very small organisations. 
Perhaps what is of greater significance than whether there are one or several 
local organisations or a single local council covering one or several locations, is 
whether these organisations are tied in to larger service delivery structures outside 
the local area, and whether the respective roles and responsibilities of this 
overlapping network of organisations are sufficiently clear. Linking with larger 
organisational structures outside the community can potentially provide professional 
support and scope for advancement, and shared expertise and supervision. It is for 
this reason that we advocate the development of regional function-specific service 
agencies to complement and work with local councils, rather than simply making 
small local councils slightly bigger; either by making them multi-locational or by 
combining different local organisations in one location. 
Regional function-specific agencies in areas such as health, housing, 
accountancy and financial services, employment recruitment or infrastructure could 
arguably have a scale and ability to develop professional and systems expertise 
which can never be the case in small multi-purpose local organisations. It is also 
apparent that those Aboriginal organisations that have been most successful in 
securing sustainable improvements in service delivery for their members have been 
specific and specialist in focus and not required to assume a number of unrelated 
functions. Successful organisations include, for example, Aboriginal Hostels Pty Ltd 
(delivering hostel care and accommodation), the Arnhem Land Progress Association 
(community store management and training), the Traditional Credit Union (banking 
and finance services), Nganampa Health (medical services) and the Centre for 
Appropriate Technology, which all fulfil specialist functions. 
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Also, multi-location local councils (which larger councils in the rural and 
remote areas of the Northern Territory would inevitably become as flagged under the 
Northern Territory Government’s proposed reforms), would introduce unnecessary 
complications regarding the division of resources and coordination between 
locations. It was instructive that the one existing multi-location community 
government council in Central Australia, Anmatjere Community Government 
Council, was not regarded by the current local governments reform proponents as a 
great past success or as a model of what the current reform proposals might lead to. 
Anmatjere Community Government Council has clearly been troubled by issues of 
multi-locational resource sharing and unnecessary coordination to such an extent 
that some within it want to develop their own single-location local organisation. 
While there is clearly room in the Northern Territory for multi-locational, 
specific-purpose service agencies, such as numerous outstation resource agencies 
operating across a single region, our general view would be that it is better to 
encourage local councils/organisations to be complemented by, and linked to, larger 
specific-purpose regional service agencies. In the remainder of this paper we explore 
further this particular model of what we call ‘regionally constructed dispersed 
governance’ by examining a number of regional service delivery arrangements of this 
type which already exist, albeit in embryonic form. 
Emerging trends in regional service delivery 
The future of ATSIC, land councils, local governments and Aboriginal organisations 
are being influenced by the same array of forces that are shaping and re-shaping the 
institutional structures and processes of government: community demand for 
improved and measurable outcomes; for coordinated service delivery; government 
demand for lower costs and accrual-based financial management; outsourcing and 
competitive tendering; the transition from providing to purchasing services; and the 
inevitability of continuing economic reform. All are having an impact on the policy 
environment in Aboriginal affairs. These are resulting in reforms leading to the 
development of ‘purchaser-provider’, ‘best practice’, ‘mutual obligation’ and ‘regional 
jurisdiction’ models in service delivery. 
Similarly, changes to Commonwealth-State inter-governmental funding 
arrangements and the moves towards embracing purchaser-provider models will 
result in the debate shifting back on to the performance of State and Territory 
Governments and outsourced tenderers for delivering specified services. These 
developments will also strengthen the recognition that mainstream programs matter 
most in terms of the funding quantum available to address continuing Aboriginal 
disadvantage. 
The Commonwealth’s recently issued discussion paper titled ‘The challenge of 
welfare dependence in the 21st Century’ and the concurrent commissioning of a 
reference group to report on welfare reform also reflect the determination of the 
current government to pursue further reforms. These forces include inevitable 
changes to the role and structure of ATSIC, and a potentially enhanced role for the 
CGC in identifying relative Aboriginal needs. 
As a result of these changes there are a number of strategic opportunities 
emerging that offer remote Aboriginal communities and their organisations options 
to develop enhanced self-governance through adopting improved regional-based 
models of service delivery. These emerging trends also provide the potential basis to 
clarify the respective roles of ATSIC, Aboriginal organisations, the Northern Territory 
land councils, the Commonwealth and Northern Territory Governments, and local 
government; and develop more collaborative approaches between key stakeholders. 
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Complexities of inter-governmental fiscal arrangements 
There are very complex funding arrangements that govern service delivery to remote 
Aboriginal communities. These are reflected in the sheer number of agencies; the 
overlapping Commonwealth, State and Territory fiscal arrangements; the division of 
roles and responsibilities between ATSIC and the Northern Territory Government; 
and the role and structures of local governance. These all serve to muddy the waters 
in developing agreed objectives and identifying lines of accountability in service 
delivery and have been commented on at length in numerous academic and 
government reports. 
Problems in improving the coordination and accountability of service delivery 
have been further compounded by a lack of reliable administrative data, and a lack 
of procedures for assessing the effectiveness of mainstream government programs in 
meeting Aboriginal needs. With the exception of some important data now emerging 
through the annual review of Commonwealth-State service provision by the 
Productivity Commission, there are few reliable figures on Aboriginal people’s access 
to mainstream programs and services. A recent exception is the independent 
evaluation of Aboriginal education in the Northern Territory undertaken by Bob 
Collins (the ‘Collins Review’) which identified systemic failures in the delivery of 
education, misuse of Commonwealth funds by the Northern Territory Government 
and the levying of high administrative costs (Northern Territory Department of 
Education 1999). 
The current plethora of funding arrangements in relation to Aboriginal service 
delivery is starkly highlighted at the remote community level where funding 
arrangements are complex and provided through numerous independent sources. 
These sources are difficult to trace, thus accentuating the fragmentation of service 
delivery, significantly hindering coordinated community development and financial 
accountability. 
Bilateral agreements in housing, infrastructure and health have attempted to 
address some of these issues. Whilst drawing criticism from time to time, these 
forms of agreements, developed under the umbrella of the National Commitment to 
Improved Outcomes in the Delivery of Services to Aboriginal Peoples, negotiated 
through the Council of Australia Governments in 1992, remain the most effective 
current instrument for defining inter-governmental roles and financial 
responsibilities. 
The functional areas under these arrangements where there has been most 
obvious progress to date, has been in relation to Aboriginal health, and housing and 
infrastructure. In respect to Aboriginal health, Framework Agreements have been 
signed in all States and Territories between the respective State and Territory 
governments, State affiliates of the National Aboriginal Community Controlled 
Health Organisation, ATSIC and the Federal Minister for Health and Family Services. 
Under the Framework Agreements, regional planning processes have been 
established for improving access to health services, Aboriginal participation in 
decision making and priority determination, and the collection of improved data. 
In the Northern Territory, the establishment of the Aboriginal Medical Services 
Alliance Northern Territory in 1994 as a peak body and forum for Aboriginal Medical 
Services, and its recognition under the Northern Territory Framework Agreement 
completed in 1997, have led to the establishment of processes that facilitate joint 
planning in the funding and coordination of Aboriginal heath services. The 
Framework Agreement is due for its initial three-year evaluation and renegotiation 
this year. 
In respect to Aboriginal housing in the Northern Territory, an agreement was 
signed by the Northern Territory and Commonwealth ministers for housing and the 
chairperson of ATSIC in 1995. This was the first specific agreement developed under 
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the umbrella of the National Commitment to Improved Outcomes in the Delivery of 
Services to Aboriginal Peoples and it has led to some significant changes in program 
structures and delivery arrangements during the five years of its existence 
Aboriginal housing agreement 
Over the last 25 years, there have been four housing programs originating at the 
Commonwealth level of government which have provided housing specifically for 
Indigenous Australians, a home loans program, a hostel program, a community 
housing organisations grants program and State/Territory grants program (see 
Sanders 1990). In the Northern Territory, the State/Territory grants programs was 
used by the Northern Territory Government during the 1980s and early 1990s to 
provide grants to Aboriginal community housing organisations outside the major 
urban areas, with Aboriginal people in the major urban areas being eligible for 
Northern Territory Government public rental housing on the same basis and 
through the same programs as non-Indigenous Territory residents. 
This was somewhat different from what had occurred in the States, where the 
State/Territory grants program, known as the Aboriginal Rental Housing Program 
(ARHP), had been initially devoted to creating an Indigenous-specific public rental 
housing stock. This use of the ARHP in the Northern Territory created a very clear 
overlap with the community housing organisations grants program, which from 
1990 was run by the Commonwealth-created ATSIC and known as the Community 
Housing and Infrastructure Program (CHIP). CHIP also directed most of its resources 
to Aboriginal communities outside the major urban areas through Aboriginal 
community housing organisations. 
This clear overlap of the uses of CHIP and ARHP funds in the Northern 
Territory provided fertile ground for the first agreement to be reached under the 
1992 National Commitment to Improved Outcomes in the Delivery of Services to 
Aboriginal Peoples. The 1995 agreement stated that the Commonwealth, the 
Northern Territory Government and ATSIC would pool these Indigenous housing 
program funds and expend them together through a new collaborative organisation 
called the Indigenous Housing Authority of the Northern Territory (IHANT). The 
IHANT would be comprised of the seven elected ATSIC regional council chairs for the 
Northern Territory plus the two elected ATSIC commissioners and a representative 
appointed by the Commonwealth Minister, probably from the Commonwealth 
housing administration. The Northern Territory Government would contribute up to 
seven ministerial nominees to the authority and also a Program Manager for the 
pooled funds from its Department of Housing and Local Government. The seven 
Northern Territory nominees were, as anticipated, administrators in other relevant 
Northern Territory Government organisations. So the new Authority emerged as a 
rather unique combination of elected Indigenous representatives and both 
Commonwealth and Northern Territory Government officials involved in housing and 
infrastructure issues. 
The 1995 agreement also required the new Authority to develop a five-year 
strategic plan with the dual objectives of allocating housing on the basis of need and 
maximising the quantity and quality of the housing stock, together with a three-year 
rolling operational plan. These planning processes and the deliberations of this 
rather unique new Authority introduced a new order and clarity to housing and 
infrastructure allocations for Aboriginal communities across the Northern Territory. 
Though there was still a bidding process and cause for argument, there was a much 
clearer, unified and coordinated framework within which this could occur. 
Indigenous representatives from the ATSIC elected arm were directly involved and 
could report back to their constituents. Housing and infrastructure provision in 
these communities was clearly better coordinated.  
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Issues of housing management over time could also be raised in the IHANT 
processes in ways that were integrated with housing and infrastructure capital 
provision. Progress on rent collection and housing maintenance issues in the 
Indigenous community housing sector have been greater under this collaborative 
regime than in previous years, though there is still considerable ground to cover. 
Rent collection has been linked to a $1,700 per annum per house grant for 
maintenance and to eligibility for further capital grants. However, rent collection is 
only the first step towards ongoing asset management, which also requires work 
teams with skills to carry out maintenance and other asset management work. Also 
questions have been raised about the appropriateness of requiring the same level of 
rent collection for all houses in all locations. In the Anmatjere case, one of the 
unnecessary multi-locational resource coordination issues arose from some 
communities wanting to collect rent, receive the $1,700 maintenance grant and be 
eligible for further capital grants, while others were not. This was difficult for IHANT 
to cope with, since the Anmatjere communities were legally all part of one 
organisation. Separate community organisations for each restricted locality may well 
have helped resolve this dilemma. 
A recent review of IHANT has led to some changes. One of these is 
regionalisation into centre and top end divisions, rather than a Territory-wide 
approach. This emerging regional IHANT is, to our minds, the sort of more 
collaborative approach to service delivery and governance for Aboriginal 
communities in the Northern Territory that needs to be further developed. It is 
consciously limited in its functional scope, so it does not try to do too much by 
spreading itself too thinly across functional areas. But its also draws in relevant 
stakeholders in a collaborative, non-adversarial way. More could be done with 
IHANT, such as the inclusion of ATSIC’s National Aboriginal Health Strategy funding 
for the Northern Territory into the funding pool, since despite its name this too is 
essentially a housing and infrastructure program which ATSIC has held back. 
However, the current IHANT approach is certainly a move in what we regard as the 
right direction of collaborative regionalism. 
These emerging arrangements in housing and infrastructure are in stark 
contrast to the reform efforts in the areas of local government and land rights 
discussed above, which have tended to continue the adversarial political culture of 
the 1980s and early 1990s. Collaborative approaches require some putting aside of 
this adversarial political culture, while also being modest in their functional range. 
Emerging models in Aboriginal primary health care—
Coordinated Care Trials 
Another of the more innovative emerging models of governance and service delivery 
occurring in the Northern Territory, are Coordinated Care Trials being jointly funded 
under the auspices of the Northern Territory and Commonwealth Governments. In 
particular, the trial being delivered to both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
communities through the Katherine West Remote Health Board Aboriginal 
Corporation (incorporated under the Commonwealth ACAA) is particularly 
instructive. 
In 1996, the Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments announced the 
establishment of a total of 13 Coordinated Care Trials across Australia, of which four 
were focused on Aboriginal communities. Coordinated Care Trials are designed to 
test whether coordination of health care of people with multiple service needs (where 
care is accessed through individual care plans, and funds pooled from existing 
Commonwealth, State, Territory and joint programs) will result in improved 
individual client health and wellbeing. 
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In the Northern Territory, two trials are being undertaken—one on the Tiwi 
Islands and the other located in the Katherine West region. Both these trials were 
recently further extended as a result of the 1999–2000 budget. The Tiwi and 
Katherine West trials incorporate several features that make them distinct from 
other non-Aboriginal trials. 
Firstly, responsibility for allocating health resources within the respective 
regions has shifted from the government-operated Territory Health Services to 
Regional Health Boards. The Tiwi Health Board has responsibility for Bathurst and 
Melville Islands. The Katherine West Remote Health Board Aboriginal Corporation 
(KWHB) covers a large remote area stretching westward from Katherine to the West 
Australian border. KWHB comprises representatives of Aboriginal communities in 
the area, including Lajamanu, Kalkaringi, Dagaragu, Yarralin, Pigeon Hole, Bulla 
and Amanbidgi. It also has an advisory committee to the board comprising non-
Aboriginal representatives from the Northern Territory Cattlemen’s Association and 
the Timber Creek Community Government Council. 
Funds that would have been normally allocated to the provision of health 
services in the respective regions by the Northern Territory Government have been 
‘pooled’ and provided to the health boards which may, subject to agreed conditions, 
allocate these monies consistent with the board's own priorities. 
The second characteristic is that both boards receive additional funds from the 
Health Insurance Commission in the form of Medical Benefit 
Scheme/Pharmaceutical Benefit Scheme (MBS/PBS) cashouts. Residents of remote 
Aboriginal communities rarely receive rebates through either MBS or PBS, for the 
simple fact that that there are very few doctors or pharmacists to generate such 
rebates and Aboriginal people by and large do not utilise Medicare cards. This has, 
in turn, contributed to Aboriginal utilisation of the Medicare Benefits Scheme 
running at only one-quarter of the rate compared to that of other Australians, 
notwithstanding their health needs are approximately three times higher (Deeble et 
al. 1998). 
This is a major source of inequity in the present health system of remote area 
health care, when compared to funds and services available to the rest of the 
community. For the purposes of the Aboriginal trials, the Commonwealth has agreed 
to fund a per capita amount (additional to the normal Northern Territory 
Government funding allocation) based on ‘the estimated’ average MBS/PBS rebate 
paid to citizens paid throughout Australia, amounting to approximately $536 per 
person per year. 
A third characteristic is that the Aboriginal trials are designed to deliver 
services on a ‘whole of population basis’, rather than serving the health needs of an 
identified sub-set of the community, as applies in the non-Aboriginal trials. The 
rationale behind this approach is to secure a greater emphasis on preventative, 
population-based measures than has been possible in the past. 
Finally, the trials incorporate the principles of ‘care coordination’. Prior to the 
commencement of the trials, Territory Health Services facilitated the adoption of a 
number of best-practice protocols for management of chronic diseases and the 
development of a new computer-based client record system. 
The critical attraction of this scheme in respect to Aboriginal communities is 
that participating communities are ‘cashed out’ with an additional payment 
calculated on gaining normal access to, and equivalent usage of, both the MBS and 
PBS. In Katherine West alone this represented a net increase of $1.5 million per 
annum. Data on the effectiveness of these trials awaits the public release of 
independent evaluations due later this year. 
Nevertheless, based on discussions with the manager of the KWHB and other 
available data on coordinated health trials more generally, the operations of the 
Katherine West Coordinated Care Trial are particularly instructive as a potential 
WORKING PAPER NO. 6 13 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
model of service delivery for application in other remote jurisdictions. Of 
considerable relevance is the changed role of the KWHB, from originally being a 
purchaser of health services provided by Territory Health Services, to now itself 
becoming a direct provider of services through health centres located in five 
Aboriginal communities. This has created significant problems for KWHB that were 
not envisaged in the original planning for the trial, and present a number of lessons 
for governance structures and service delivery. 
In moving to establish the KWHB, the board adopted a carefully planned and 
strategic approach towards building constructive links with other ‘community’ 
stakeholders across the region including: 
• establishing an elected governing board with numbers of members selected 
under a per capita formula from individual communities; 
• investing heavily in educating Board members to effectively carry out their 
representative functions (including utilising innovative reporting systems 
designed for people with low literacy levels); 
• initiating dialogue with the Northern and Central Land Councils with a view to 
securing leases from relevant Land Trusts for KWHB operations; 
• securing Memoranda Of Understanding with local community councils to ensure 
regular communication and clarify respective roles and responsibilities; 
• establishing health committees in individual communities that focus solely on 
health issues; and 
• carrying out extensive consultation with non-Aboriginal residents of the region 
living on pastoral properties and small townships, leading to the establishment 
of a consultative sub-committee representing the Cattlemen’s Association and 
‘town residents’ and agreement of non-Aboriginal residents to participate in the 
trial. 
Improvements reported by KWHB in the level of delivery of health services since the 
commencement of the trial include: 
• significant increases in the level of staffing of community health centres 
(including Aboriginal Health Workers); 
• improved provision of mobile primary care services to Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal pastoral properties and outstations; 
• a doubling of primary care doctor visits to communities; 
• for the first time, locating resident general practitioners in Aboriginal 
communities; 
• establishment of women’s and aged care programs; and 
• increased delivery of dental and specialist services. 
Lessons learned from Coordinated Care trials 
The basic proposition underpinning the Katherine West Coordinated Care Trial is 
that community control (in the form of health boards), with fund pooling and the 
MBS/PBS cashouts, together with care coordination, can lead to improved health 
services and indirectly to improved health outcomes. Despite the above reported 
improvements in service delivery, a number of significant issues have emerged. 
These require careful consideration by Aboriginal organisations contemplating 
participation in future trials (the Commonwealth has allocated monies for the 
expansion of the scheme to other regions in the 1999–2000 financial year). 
Because of perceived difficulties with the adequacy of the delivery of health 
services purchased by the KWHB from Territory Health Services, the KWHB has 
itself assumed direct responsibility for the delivery of primary health care services in 
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a number of community health centres, thus moving from being a purchaser to a 
direct provider of health services. These problems reputedly revolved around the 
difficulties faced by Territory Health Services in maintaining adequate staffing of 
remote community health centres, the resultant difficulties in maintaining 
continuity in service delivery, training and essential records management and the 
high levels of administrative or ‘on-costs’ charges levied by the Northern Territory 
Government (52% ‘on-costs’ per purchased position). 
As a result of this change, KWHB has assumed significant recruitment and 
ongoing management functions. It has also inherited a historically determined 
baseline Territory Health Services funding formula that may not reflect the level of 
actual needs faced in the region, a transfer of individual position funding minus the 
‘on-costs’ component, plus costs such as an arbitrary surcharge of 25 per cent on 
supplies provided to Community Health Centres by Territory Health Services. This 
has already led to the KWHB experiencing a shortfall in Territory Health Services 
funding in operating the community health centres. This has, in turn, led to the 
board dipping into the MBS/PBS ‘cash out’ monies to meet the difference. This 
development is completely at odds with the original objective of these new funds, 
which was to allocate them to new initiatives. 
The KWHB has also expressed concern that their assumption of direct 
responsibility for delivering services should not be read as one that leads to a 
Territory Health Services ‘withdrawal from the region’s health delivery landscape’. It 
argues for the continuing and critical ‘safety net’ role of Northern Territory Health 
Services in the delivery of services in a number of critical areas (KWHB 1999). 
The other major concern arises from a consideration of the current model for 
cashing out MBS/PBS funds on a capped per capita basis, based on an average 
usage by all Australians with average health status. Unresolved issues emerge here 
on two accounts. Firstly, the MBS/PBS equivalent is effectively capped in this 
instance by reference to a per capita usage figure, when MBS/PBS usage by the rest 
of the population is not capped. Secondly when the chronic health status of 
Aboriginal people in the Katherine West region is taken into account, it becomes self 
evident that applying Australian averages to the current per capita adjustment 
without incorporating morbidity and remoteness multipliers is both inequitable and 
potentially discriminatory. Estimates of the burden of disease might provide a more 
appropriate measure. 
This is also contrary to the basis on which the Northern Territory Government 
itself receives Financial Assistance Grants from the Commonwealth. This is largely 
determined by relativity adjustments that recognise the increased costs associated 
with delivering health and other services to Aboriginal Territorians. This critical 
issue was also identified in the recent Collins Review of Aboriginal education in the 
Northern Territory, which highlights the problems that arise when common funding 
formulas applied for service delivery in remote areas fail to take into account 
differing levels of need and service provision costs in Aboriginal communities 
(Northern Territory Department of Education 1999). 
When considered against a backdrop of projections that anticipate a 20 per 
cent rise in general hospital admissions for Northern Territory Aboriginal people by 
2006 (KWHB 1999), and while the incidence of end-stage renal disease is doubling 
every four years in the Top End (KWHB 1999), the case for focusing on improving 
community-based care services is compelling on economic grounds alone. 
There are therefore serious, and at this point of time, unresolved funding 
issues that Aboriginal organisations should be aware of and carefully negotiate 
before participating in any future trials. An emerging lesson in respect of the KWHB 
is to ensure that funding arrangements are carefully negotiated beforehand, or that 
specific clauses are included in any agreement to renegotiate funding arrangements 
within a specified period. This is an essential safeguard, particularly where the 
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sponsoring organisation may contemplate moving from being a purchaser to a 
provider of services. 
Notwithstanding these issues, the Coordinated Care Trials have highlighted the 
inequitable position faced by most remote Aboriginal communities when their access 
to funded health services is compared to that of the rest of the population. More 
positively, however, these trials have provided a significant opportunity for 
Aboriginal communities to assume community control of health services and, at the 
same time, demonstrate that they may be better placed to service non-Aboriginal 
health servicing needs than the usual government provider. In moving to 
successfully establish the KWHB a number of critical steps were undertaken that 
should be relevant considerations for other regionally-based organisations in 
delivering services to Aboriginal communities in remote areas. These include: 
• a sustained period (six months) of intensive consultation and negotiation with all 
affected communities and key stakeholders before the establishment of KWHB; 
• adoption of a multi-pronged strategy in maintaining ongoing communication 
with all stakeholders, backed up where relevant by formal agreement (regional 
service delivery agreements) which clarify respective roles and responsibilities 
between KWHB and other organisations such as land councils and community 
councils; 
• a strong emphasis on the establishment and support (including training) of the 
governing Board; 
• a recognition that Aboriginal-controlled health services established in small 
individual communities outside major urban centres in the Northern Territory 
are no longer viable as entirely autonomous, stand alone agencies. Rather they 
should be operated at the local level under the umbrella of a regional 
organisation, with an ability to purchase and provide services for Aboriginal and 
non-Aboriginal residents; 
• that funding arrangements need to be carefully negotiated with governments 
from the outset with the inclusion of specific safeguards in agreements to ensure 
that funding issues are able to be periodically reviewed and renegotiated; and 
• that proposals to participate in Coordinated Care Trials should take careful note 
of the experience of other trials involving Aboriginal communities. In particular, 
care should be taken to balance the advantages and disadvantages of adopting 
an approach of becoming a direct service provider as opposed to being a 
purchaser-provider under such a trial. 
New mechanisms for agreement-making 
More effective delivery of services to Northern Territory Aboriginal people will not be 
achieved merely through the creation of more institutional structures or by 
transforming land councils or local governments into regional service delivery 
organisations. Arguably, improved outcomes will be achieved through the creation of 
enhanced processes for the institutional coordination of service delivery at all levels, 
which critically link local to regional structures, and by a more holistic approach to 
how the regionalisation reform agenda will be enacted by all levels of government 
and by Aboriginal organisations themselves. 
The negotiation of Regional Service Delivery Agreements provides a potential 
mechanism for helping to ensure the enhancement of the processes referred to above 
(Smith 1998). Such agreements could be developed for specified geographic areas to 
address the delivery of any specific set of services, and subject to any conditions. 
Such regional agreements could be used to: 
• clearly define mutual organisational roles and obligations for the range of 
services required by an Aboriginal population; 
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• outline respective funding sources and responsibilities; 
• develop purchaser provider arrangements; as well as 
• establish agreed, comprehensive, performance indicators and outcomes. 
The critical advantages of Regional Service Delivery Agreements are many. For 
example, over the longer term such service agreements could also be used to: 
• beneficially define the respective rights and interests of traditional owners and 
other Aboriginal residents of a region; 
• set down the practical exercise of those rights and interests in respect to service 
delivery; 
• establish component ‘community agreements’ about any land use and 
management matters relevant to the more effective delivery of services which can 
be progressively built upon; and 
• contain agreements about land access, land use and rental issues within 
communities; the operation of the permit system; service delivery benchmarks; 
and the reciprocal rights and obligations of residents and traditional owners 
entailed by the receipt of services (Smith 1998). 
The development of Regional Service Delivery Agreements would be likely to: 
• lead to more productive and practical partnerships between Aboriginal people, 
the Northern Territory Government and local governments, land councils, ATSIC 
and regionally based service delivery organisations and therefore move away 
from the adversarial relationships to date; 
• protect the inalienable rights and interests of traditional owners under the ALRA; 
• overcome the duplication and lack of co-ordination of service delivery; 
• facilitate contestability and the meeting of mutual obligations in service delivery; 
• facilitate progressive implementation which can be more easily monitored; 
• deliver more effective outcomes for regional Aboriginal populations; and 
• encourage greater cost effectiveness and minimisation through cost-sharing and 
reduced duplication. 
ATSIC could consider moving incrementally in this direction by letting 
contracts for specific functional areas of service delivery. These contracts would 
incorporate contractual selection criteria reflecting the adoption by tenderers of the 
enhanced processes of agreement making referred to above. 
This would encourage currently disparate communities to collaborate not only 
in the negotiation of Regional Service Delivery Agreements, but also in the 
development or enhancement of existing regional functionally-specific service 
organisations to jointly service their needs. These regionally based organisations 
could deliver services that are currently subject to unnecessary duplication in 
administrative costs (e.g. accountancy) or where individual communities lack the 
economies of scale to secure and service contracts (e.g. road construction and 
maintenance). 
These reforms could also open up opportunities for more strategic application 
of the Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme in securing 
public and private contracts by pooling labour and combining resources at the 
regional level in the purchase of necessary capital equipment. These reforms could 
lead, for example, to regional Aboriginal organisations striking agreements with 
governments, community councils and land councils to coordinate the provision 
and/or deliver services on behalf of governments and their agencies to regional 
Aboriginal populations. Aboriginal organisations (such as regional health services, 
etc.) could also join forces, via formal agreements, to deliver services on a regional 
basis and achieve economies of scale by reducing administrative costs. 
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What are the major lessons? 
So what are the major lessons that can be learnt from the historical 
development of Aboriginal self-governing structures and service delivery in the 
Northern Territory over the past 30 years? 
In summary 
• The historical emergence of adversarial relationships between Aboriginal 
interests and the Northern Territory Government over governance and service 
delivery issues are counterproductive, and need to be overcome and replaced by 
more collaborative approaches if real progress is to be made. This will require, in 
the first instance, the development of a more strategic and collaborative 
approach between Indigenous organisations themselves in securing effective and 
sustainable control over service delivery. If this does not occur, significant and 
emerging opportunities to advance the more effective delivery of services to, and 
governance by, Aboriginal people potentially are lost. 
• Reforms towards establishing regional or amalgamated jurisdictions of service 
delivery need to balanced by a recognition that in remote Aboriginal communities 
many services must still be addressed at the local level and require the 
maintenance of appropriate and viable structures. One of the principal problems 
of the community government scheme is that it assumed these organisations 
could undertake responsibility for a multiple range of service delivery functions. 
In most cases, experience has proved that these organisations simply do not 
have the capacity to undertake a wide range of functions. It is therefore 
preferable to encourage local councils/organisations to be complemented by, and 
linked to, larger specific-purpose regional service agencies (not merely replaced). 
Another critical consideration is that any reforms in local government structures 
should aim to ensure the resultant structures have more clearly defined, 
specialist functions. These should aim to complement rather than duplicate 
those of other existing Indigenous organisations such as the land councils. This 
is best described as a regionally dispersed governance model which involves the 
development of regional function-specific service agencies to complement and 
work with local councils, rather than simply making small local councils slightly 
bigger, or by making them multi-locational. 
• Whilst governments have been preoccupied with the issue of external 
accountability there has been almost a complete absence of focus on developing 
mechanisms or criteria in respect to assessing levels of internal accountability; 
except for financial matters. Nor has the comparative performance between 
Indigenous institutions in improving the wellbeing of their constituents been 
actively pursued with a view to assessing why some Indigenous structures work 
better than others in delivering real and sustainable outcomes for their 
constituents. 
• There is clearly a need for a more systematic examination focusing on the 
comparative effectiveness of Indigenous self-governance models in Australia, not 
only to focus on issues of internal accountability, but to examine the reasons 
some communities are more successful in running their affairs than others. 
• The emphasis on the development and resourcing of Aboriginal-specific programs 
is shifting to recognition that mainstream programs are also critical (e.g. the 
Medicare and Pharmaceutical Benefit schemes) in accessing the funding 
quantum necessary to properly address Aboriginal needs in remote communities. 
Even where this is already occurring, the new funding arrangements (whilst 
arguably a vast improvement on those that applied previously) are highlighting 
the chronic inequities that apply to the funding of services to remote Aboriginal 
communities, when compared to the rest of the community.  
• The emergence of outsourcing, user pays/purchaser provider and best-value 
models in delivering services offer significant opportunities for remote Aboriginal 
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communities to gain access to, and control over, the delivery of services critical 
to their wellbeing. However these opportunities will be lost unless they are 
strategically negotiated and appropriate regional structures put in place to 
support efficient and effective service delivery. 
• The incremental negotiation of Regional Service Delivery Agreements provides a 
potential mechanism to establish enhanced processes for the institutional 
coordination of service delivery at all levels, and to link local to regional 
structures. 
• Questions surrounding the relative merits of Indigenous organisations 
incorporating under Commonwealth or Northern Territory legislation should be 
determined by rational assessments of the advantages and disadvantages of 
both. 
What then is the outlook for the future? 
Demographic and socioeconomic data for Central Australia drawn from the 
1996 Census confirms that reforms of local government and service delivery are 
occurring in the context of an underlying demographic trend that could see the 
socioeconomic status of Aboriginal Australians in Central Australia deteriorate. This 
is primarily due to population growth, but also because of the enormous difficulties 
of economic catch-up in a rapidly changing and globalising world economy and 
because of local and historical infrastructure shortfalls. For example, decline in the 
ratio of mean income for rural-based Indigenous people in the Northern Territory 
compared to those in urban areas is largely due to their reliance on welfare 
equivalent income generated from the CDEP scheme. Overall, while Indigenous 
people in urban areas such as Alice Springs have incomes around half that of non-
Indigenous town residents, Indigenous people resident in remote communities 
outside the town are even more starkly disadvantaged compared to those in urban 
areas.  
This economic disadvantage is reflected in the fact that the unemployment 
level among Indigenous Territorians has worsened relatively and now stands at three 
times the level recorded for non-Indigenous adults in the Northern Territory. As a 
direct consequence, Indigenous welfare reliance in the ATSIC regions of Aputula and 
Alice Springs is far higher, at 64 per cent of the population, than that for the non-
Indigenous population of the Northern Territory which runs at 8 per cent. The 
analyses over a ten-year period between 1986 and 1996 (Taylor and Roach 1998) 
strongly suggest the continuing and substantial deterioration in income and 
employment levels on remote Indigenous communities, and the need for continued 
government subvention by way of welfare transfers and labour market programs. 
The net effect may be that despite the current and proposed structural 
reforms, the economic marginalisation of remote Aboriginal communities will be 
exacerbated unless their needs are specifically recognised under the future 
arrangements that will determine more effective levels of service delivery and self-
governance. There are a wide-ranging series of proposals either under consideration 
or already in the public arena involving reforms to self-governance structures that 
deliver services to Aboriginal people in the Northern Territory. Critical to all is a 
policy momentum towards institutional regionalisation and continuing reform in the 
delivery of services. 
This paper suggests that enhanced service outcomes will be best achieved by 
adopting a model of ‘regionally dispersed self-governance’, which encourages the 
development of specialist regional service-delivery organisations which operate and 
work collaboratively with each other and with local community organisations. In 
particular, the momentum towards institutional regionalisation at different levels of 
government needs to be addressed on a holistic basis and considered concurrently, 
with a view to encouraging consistency of administrative boundaries, and the 
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establishment of durable and effective agreements that differentiate and allocate 
service roles and responsibilities. 
The far preferable model for change is one which maintains a clearly defined 
separation of powers between the key Aboriginal structures engaged in land 
management and use on behalf of traditional owners, and those representing a wider 
regional constituency in terms of service delivery. 
The mainstreaming policy approach to funding of services to Aboriginal 
Australians is now being more widely adopted by the Commonwealth Government. 
This is reflected in the growing trend to transfer Aboriginal-specific programs from 
ATSIC to mainstream agencies and for these programs to be delivered in conjunction 
with mainstream programs (e.g. health, housing and infrastructure). The parallel 
trend is also towards a greater emphasis on State and Territory responsibility for 
service delivery with less perceived interference by the Commonwealth (e.g. via more 
untied funds as a result of the Goods and Services Tax), and towards more regionally 
coherent jurisdictions for service delivery. 
Outsourcing and user pays/purchaser provider models 
Of equal or even more strategic importance to Aboriginal interests is the 
emphasis by all governments in adopting outsourcing and purchaser provider 
models as the primary means of delivering services. These changes are reflected 
through the Commonwealth’s establishment of Centrelink and the contracting out of 
the delivery of employment services. Similarly, State and Territory governments are 
adopting similar approaches to the delivery of health and education services. 
These reforms offer real opportunities, as well as real risks, in respect to 
Aboriginal service delivery. If they are not negotiated and implemented carefully, or 
are imposed arbitrarily, the results will be counter-productive. In the mainstream, 
momentum is clearly moving towards rationalising the number of government-
funded service delivery organisations at the regional level, and implementing 
contestability through competitive tendering arrangements and ‘best-value’. 
The model being advocated here recognises the need for reform by placing a 
greater emphasis on the formalised negotiation and implementation of Regional 
Service Delivery Agreements and by developing a multi-tiered organisational 
structure at the local and regional levels. These agreements should reflect reforms in 
relation to best practice in service delivery and provide for mutual accountability. 
Recommendations 
The confluence of various reform agenda provides an opportunity to Aboriginal 
organisational interests to collaborate and map out an incremental agenda for 
reform to address the long-term socioeconomic disadvantage of Aboriginal peoples in 
the Northern Territory. However it also represents a challenge for Aboriginal 
organisations to work more strategically and collaboratively with each other, to enter 
into agreements about their respective roles and responsibilities, and to initiate 
research and analysis in developing required policy options. These could include the 
following: 
• Aboriginal interests, through their representative organisations, initiating a 
process to develop a combined, planned and strategic engagement with the 
Northern Territory and Commonwealth Governments with the objective of 
securing long-term and sustainable control over the delivery of services; 
• clarification of the respective roles and responsibilities between ATSIC, the land 
councils, and regionally-based Aboriginal service delivery organisations in co-
ordinating, negotiating and delivering services, including possible options for 
entering into Regional Service Delivery Agreements; 
20 WESTBURY AND SANDERS 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
• examination of reforms in service delivery including, for example, outsourcing, 
user pays and purchaser-provider models in the Northern Territory and the 
options for ensuring opportunities are maximised and any negative impacts are 
ameliorated; 
• exploration of the potential for the development of alternative approaches to the 
reform of local government that reflect the local and regional needs and 
requirements of people in Central Australia; 
• exploration of the potential for the development of more effective governance 
structures, on the basis of defined criteria, and within the framework of the 
regionally dispersed model proposed here; 
• consideration be given to commissioning research aimed at systematically 
examining the reasons why some communities and their organisations are more 
successful in running their affairs than others and to develop criteria to measure 
and explain such effectiveness; and 
• consideration of the forthcoming CGC inquiry into the relative needs of 
Indigenous Australians and its potential relevance to the Northern Territory. 
ATSIC Alice Springs is well placed to facilitate work in these areas and to 
initially bring key Aboriginal stakeholders together to consider and address the 
above recommendations as a series of progressive steps.  
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